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[45 C.2d 751; 290 P.2d 852J

[Crim. No. 5764. In Bank. Dec. 9, 1955.]
.&

THE PEOPLE, Appellant, v. BEVERLY MICHAEL,
Respondent.
[1] Searches and Seizures-Resistance or Oonsent.-To protect his
right to object to an unreasonable search or seizure a defendant need not forcibly resist an officer's assertion of authority
to enter his home or search it or his person, but if he freely
consents to an entry or search, or voluntarily produces evidence against himself, his constitutional rights are not violated
and any search or taking of evidence pursuant to his consent
is not unreasonable.
[2] Id.-Oonsent.-Whether in a particular case an apparent consent was in fact voluntarily given or was in submission to an
express or implied assertion of authority is a question of fact
to be determined in the light of the circumstances.
[3a,3b] Id.-Oonsent.-The evidence in a narcotics case was sufficient to show that the officers' entry into defendant's home
and subsequent discoveries were made with the consent of
defendant and her mother where the officers went to such
home, identified themselves, were admitted by defendant's
mother, and asked defendant whether she had any narcotics,
whereupon defendant's mother left the room and returned with
a bottle containing a narcotic, after which defendant, after
being asked whether she had any more narcotics, produced
a box from her bedroom containing other narcotics and hypodermic equipment, such evidence showing that the narcotics
were voluntarily produced in response to a reasonable inquiry.
[4] ld.-Voluntary Production of Evidence.-It is not unreasonable for officers to seek interviews with suspects or witnesses
or to call on them at their homes for such purposes, and if
such inquiries result in the criminal's voluntary revealing of
the evidence against him he may not thereafter assert that
he acted only in response to an implied assertion of unlawful
authority.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County granting motion to set aside an information.
David Coleman, Judge. Reversed.
[1] See Oal.Jur., Searches and Seizures, § 2 et seq.; Am.lur.,
Searches and Seizures, § 6 et seq.
licK. Dig. Reference: [1-4] Searches and Seizures, I L
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Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, William E. James,
Deputy Attorney General, S. Ernest Roll, District Attorney
(Los Angeles), Jere J. Sullivan and Lewis Watnick, Deputy
District Attorneys, for Appellant.
Forno & Umann and Harry M. Umann for Respondent.
A. L. Wirin and Fred Okrand as Amici Curiae on behalf
of Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J .-By information defendant was charged
with four counts of possessing narcotics in violation of Health
and Safety Code, section 11500, and one prior felony con·
viction of violating the same section. Her motion to set the
information aside (see Pen. Code, § 995) was granted on
the ground that all of the evidence against her had been
obtained by an illegal search and seizure in violation of her
constitutional rights. The People appeal.
At the time of her arrest defendant was living at her
mother's home. Two state narcotics inspectors, an investigator from the Los Angeles district attorney's office, and a
Los Angeles police officer went to defendant's residence. They
knocked on the door, identified themselves as officers, and
were admitted by defendant's mother. They did not have
a search warrant. One of the officers identified himself to
defendant and asked her if she had any narcotics in the
house. Defendant's mother then left the room and returned
with a bottle containing a narcotic, which the officer took
from her. She told the officers that "This is all she has."
Defendant told the officer she knew the bottle contained a
narcotic, and on being asked whether she had any more
narcotics, she produced a box from her bedroom containing
other narcotics and hypodermic equipment, which she handed
to the officer. Defendant was a.rrested, the evidence was taken
to police headquarters and analyzed, and four narcotics were
identified.
The attorney general contends that the evidence in this case
was voluntarily produced by defendant and her mother and
was therefore not illegally obtained. Defendant, on the other
hand, contends that the admission of the officers into her home
and the production of the narcotics were in submission to
authority and without effective consent. Accordingly, she
contends that anything the officers heard and any physical
evidence they obtained after the entry without a warrant was
inadmissible.
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[1] To protect his right to object to an unreasonable
search or seizure a defendant need not forcibly resist an
officer's assertion of authority.to enter his home or search it
or his person (United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 594
[68 S.Ct. 222, 92 L.Ed. 210]; Amos v. United States, 255
U.S. 313, 317 [4 S.Ct. 266, 65 L.Ed. 654]), but if he freely
consents to an entry or search, or voluntarily produces evidence against himself, his constitutional rights are not violated
and any search or taking of evidence pursuant to his consent
is not unreasonable. (Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624,
628 [66 S.Ct. 1277, 90 L.Ed. 1477] ; Davis v. United States,
328 U.S. 582, 593-594 [66 S.Ct. 1256, 90 L.Ed. 1453] ; In re
Dixon, 41 Ca1.2d 756, 761 [264 P.2d 513].) [2] Whether
in a particular case an apparent consent was in fact voluntarily given or was in submission to an express or implied
assertion of authority, is a question of fact to be determined
in the light of all the circumstances. Since the cases that
have determined this question under varying factual circumstances are difficult if not impossible to reconcile (compare
e.g., Davis v. UnUed States, supra, 328 U.S. 582, 593-594,
with Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 12-13 [68 S.Ct.
367, 92 L.Ed. 436] ; Waxm.an v. United States, 12 F.2d 775,
with Pritchett v. State, 78 Okla.Crim. 67 [143 P.2d 622,
623-625] ; Smuk v. People, 72 Colo. 97 [209 P. 636, 637], with
Salata v. United States, 286 F. 125, 127), and may reflect
imperfectly the factual situations before the courts that
decided them, they point to no compelling solution in the
present case. [3a] On the record before us, we have concluded that the officer's testimony before the magistrate
constituted sufficient evidence that the entry into the house
and subsequent discoveries were made with the consent of
defendant and her mother to justify the admission and use
of the evidence at the preliminary hearing to establish probable cause for holding defendant to answer.
This is not a case in which entry was made pursuant to
the supposed authority of an invalid search warrant. (See
United States v. Kelih, 272 F. 484, 490; Salata v. United
States, supra, 286 F. 125, 127; Hernandez v. State, 137 Tex.
Crim. 343 [129 S.W.2d 301, 305 j.) Nor is it a case in which
the officers entered without the permission or knowledge of
the occupants (see Dukes v. United States, 275 F. 142, 144145; Farris v. United States, 24 F.2d 639, 640), or demanded the right to search without a warrant. (See Amos
v. United States, supra, 255 U.S. 313, 317; United States v.
j
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Slusser, 270 F. 818, 819.)
All that appears is that
four officcrs went to defendant's home, ide~tified themselves,
and were admitted by defendant's mother. Within approximately a minute of their arrival they asked defendant if
she had any narcotics, and all of the evidence was then voluntat:ily produced by the two women. Under these circumstances, to hold as a matter of law that the evidence was
produced in response to an unlawful assertion of authority
would seriously hamper officers in the reasonable performance
of their duties. [4] Thus, it is not unreasonable for officers
to seek interviews with suspects or witnesses or to call upon
them at their homes for such purposes. Such inquiries,
although courteously made and not accompanied with any
assertion of a right to enter or search or secure answers,
would permit the criminal to defeat his prosecution by voiuntarily revealing all of the evidence against him and then
contending that he acted only in response to an implied assertion of unlawful authority.
[3b] We are not unmindful of the fact that the appearance
of four officers at the door may be a disturbing experience,
and that a request to enter made to a distraught or timid
woman might under certain circumstances carry with it an
implied assertion of authority that the occupant should not
be expected to resist. (See State v. Lindway, 131 Ohio St.
]66 [2 N.E.2d 490, 493]; People v. Lind, 370 Ill. 131 [18
N.E.2d 189, 192] ; Petition of Shoemaker, 9 F.2d 170, 171.)
Neither defendant nor her mother testified at the preliminary
hearing, however, and the testimony that was given indicates
only that the evidence was voluntarily produced in response
to a reasonable inquiry. (See In re Dixon, supra, 41 Ca1.2d
756, 761; Gray v. State, 243 Wis. 57, 63 [9 N.W.2d 68]:
United States v. Pugliese, 153 F.2d 497, 498-499; United
States v. Sferas, 210 F.2d 69, 73-74; State v. Hagan, 47 Idaho
315 [274 P. 628. 629] ; lIernandez v. State, supra, 137 Tex.
Crim. 343 [129 S.W.2d 301, 305J: Olark v. Btate, 78 Okla.
Crim. 423 [149 P.2d 994, 996-997].)
The order is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J.,
and McComb, J. pro tem.,· concurred.

• Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council.
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